JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The power of rational intuition varies in men. Thus, for example, some men can arrive at the middle term of a syllogism intuitively. Others are totally incapable of this. The intuitive capacities of the former, moreover, varies. Thus it is only after a long process of cogitation that some men can intuit the middle term. Others intuit this in a shorter time. Some are able to arrive intuitively at several middle terms at one time; others cannot do so. This variation in intuitive capabilities can be represented as a progressive scale whose limit in the direction of weakness consists in the inability to intuit at all. If limited in the direction of weakness, it must find a limit in the direction of strength. It finds this limit in the ability to intuit all the middle terms sought instantaneously, without any preparatory cogitative process. From this Avicenna concludes, not that men with such ultimate intuitive powers must exist, but rather, that "it is possible" (fa yumkin idhan) that they exist. Such individuals would be prophets. 
assertions that have been treated as the necessary without the benefit of demonstrative argument or even dialectical proof, or else, impossible assertions on the order of fairy tales, such that the very attempt on the part of their advocates to expound them deserves derision.
Avicenna, hence, is expected to give an argument for prophecy that does not commit any of the logical transgressions of such "advocates of prophecy." One suspects that nothing less than a demonstration is expected of him. Does he then attempt a demonstration, and if he does, what is it precisely that he endeavors to prove?
Now, the discussion that immediately follows this introductory passage consists, in reality, of three distinct though related arguments. The first and longest 5 seems to be an attempt to establish that there must exist in some individuals a prophetic faculty, the angelic intellect, that receives revelation. This is followed by a section that recapitulates the first argument's premises,6 but which also introduces a short argument based on these premises for the finitude of the human soul.7 This, in turn, is followed by a third argument which is metaphysical and normative.8
Having established in the first argument the existence of a prophetic faculty in some men, Avicenna proceeds to argue that the man possessing such a faculty, i.e. the prophet, stands highest in the order of value in the world of generation and corruption. The normative discussion, though in itself important for our understanding of Avicenna's theory of prophecy,9 is not properly speaking a proof of prophecy. It depends on the first argument and involves a process of classification that assumes a system of values.
Hence, if there is a proof for the existence of prophecy among these arguments, it would have to be the first of these three. And, indeed, it seems to have all the elements of a demonstration: it begins by discussing and defining certain concepts that serve as premises; it then subjects the faculties of the human rational soul to an analysis in terms of these premises deriving thereby its conclusion. Yet, despite this appearance of rigor, the proof abounds with difficulties, logical and linguistic. It often states its points rather than argues for them. Some of its important premises are hidden so that it is not at first sight clear how it arrives at the conclusion it gives. And, when it attempts to define the relation of the prophetic intellect to the non-prophetic, which is the heart of the problem, it is vague and ambiguous. Such difficulties in the proof raise for the student of Avicenna questions regarding the author's ultimate purpose and motive in writing it.1o Ours, however, is the preliminary and necessary task of examining the proof as it stands in the treatise, taking it at its face value. Hence, we shall treat the proof formally in an attempt to clarify some of its ambiguities, extract its hidden premises, reveal the reasoning pattern involved and point out some of the difficulties it raises.
However, we cannot proceed with our process (which takes place in time) before they receive the intelligible they seek, the number of intelligibles they receive at any one time is limited. The prophet, on the 11 In Avicenna's emanative scheme, each of the celestial spheres possesses a soul and an intelligence. The intelligence is a purely intellectual principle and is utterly immaterial. Hence its knowledge is universal. It cannot know the particulars in the world of generation and corruption individually: it knows them "in a universal way." The celestial soul, on the other hand, has a material aspect which enables it to know the particular things and events in the sublunary sphere. Indeed, its knowledge of the particulars is a cause of particular events. It is thus capable of knowing particular events. This knowledge of the future it transmits to the prophet through his imaginative faculty. Avicenna's De Anima, p. 173 ff. Ibn Sini, Ildhiyydt, II, 435 ff.
12 In TR this is referred to as the universal intellect, universal soul, and world soul. The intellect and the soul seem to be identified. Strictly speaking, intellectual revelation is the direct reception of knowledge from the celestial intelligences, through the last of these, the universal intellect or active intelligence. The knowledge transmitted is universal. However, the prophet can translate this universal knowledge into particular applications thereof. In this lies his political ability. (TR, p. 124, 11. 5-9). This translation can occur unconsciously where the prophetic knowledge in the rational soul causes in the imaginative soul particular examples, often in symbolic form. Avicenna's De Anima, p. 249.
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In TR, p. 122, 11, 7-8, Avicenna regards universally accepted moral dicta on a par with selfevident logical truths inasmuch as both are received directly from the universal active intelligence. As such these moral dicta should have the same claim for certainty as logical truths. It is the status of this intellect in relation to the material that the argument proceeds to discuss. Since the secondary intelligibles are not always present in the human rational soul, or, as the proof expresses it, since the acquired intellect "does not exist actually in the material intellect," its existence in the rational soul is not an essential existence.
[This inference follows from premises (2) and (4).] The conclusion of this part of the argument is then given:24
Hence the existence of the acquired intellect in the material intellect is due to something in which it exists essentially25 and which causes existence; through it what was potential becomes actual. This is called the universal intellect, the universal soul and the world soul.
This conclusion states two things: (a) that since the acquired intellect exists accidentally in the rational soul, it must exist essentially in something else; (b) that this something else is the universal intellect. The first of these conclusions betrays an important premise which is not explicitly stated, but which seems to be implied in the first three premises.26 This hidden premise is as follows: if an inhering property exists in one thing accidentally, it must exist essentially in another. Since this premise is operative in the main deduction of the proof, we will refer to it as premise (5). The second conclusion above, stating that it is the universal intellect in which the acquired intellect must exist, assumes Avicenna's emanative system. It is true that this is part of an argument for the existence of the universal intellect which Avicenna expounds in greater detail elsewhere. To begin with, when Avicenna states that the (ordinary) human rational soul "receives at times directly and at times indirectly," "at times" cannot be taken in the temporal sense. Otherwise the angelic intellect that receives directly and essentially must be receiving knowledge all the time and this is not a view which Avicenna advocates. Hence, this must merely mean that, since the reception of the ordinary human soul is not entirely direct (it receives only the primary, not the secondary intelligibles directly), direct reception is not its essential property. Furthermore, when we are told that the angelic intellect receives directly, this refers to its reception of the secondary intelligibles. Hence the prophet has essential direct reception because, unlike the ordinary man, he receives both kinds of intelligibles directly. This betrays yet another premise which is not explicitly given. This (which we shall refer to as premise [6]) is that essential direct reception means the reception of both the primary and the secondary intelligibles.32
Having seen this implied premise, one may still question why there should be direct essential reception at all. This, at first sight, seems an assumption. We seem to be told that, inasmuch as in the ordinary human faculties direct reception is accidental, essential direct reception must exist in some unique faculty found in some men. All that the argument could state, it would seem, is that, if such essential direct reception exists, it must exist in a faculty other than the ordinary human faculties, not that essential direct reception must exist. Indeed, it seems that the very point at issue has been assumed. This difficulty arises, however, when we are not aware that here once again the implied premise (5) 32 All that Avicenna could maintain here, it seems, is that, since direct reception in the ordinary human soul is confined to the primary intelligibles, such reception is its essential characteristic. Avicenna seems to be aware of this difficulty. He adds immediately after the passage quoted above the following statement: "The property peculiar to the primary intelligibles that allows their reception without mediation is due to one of two factors: briefly, it is either because these intelligibles in themselves are easily receivable, or because the recipient can receive without mediation only that which is easily receivable." (TR, p. 122, 11. 13-16). In other words, Avicenna here attempts to dismiss the factors that allow the direct reception of the primary intelligibles by the ordinary human soul as accidental.
can reconstruct the main deduction of the proof. Direct reception in the ordinary human rational soul is confined to the primary intelligibles. Hence, according to premise (6), it exists in this soul accidentally. If it exists accidentally in the ordinary human soul, according to premise (5), it must exist essentially in some other faculty (found in some souls). This faculty is the angelic intellect with which prophets are endowed. Such is the pattern of reasoning, and whatever the shortcomings of the proof, it is at least not circular in the way it might appear at first sight.
III
But does the proof, as it stands, satisfy the conditions of a demonstration which Avicenna articulates in his logical writings? Furthermore, does it give an adequate, not to say, an intelligible, explanation of the relation of the prophetic intellect to ordinary souls? It seems that the answer to both these questions must be in the negative. The proof remains, in the final analysis, problematical.
A demonstration, according to Avicenna, must fulfill two conditions: its premises must be certain and its conclusion valid.33 The first four premises of the proof presuppose an Aristotelian ontology. The rest of the proof, as we have indicated, assumes Avicenna's theory of the intellect and his emanative metaphysics. If the proof is to be a demonstration in the strict sense, then its presuppositions must be certain. Here we cannot review Avicenna's entire system to show that his arguments to demonstrate his system are wanting; nor is this necessary. The task has been accomplished by the very thorough criticism of his Medieval Islamic opponents such as al-Ghazali.34 But even if we grant, for the sake of argument, the proof's presuppositions and consider it within the system to which it belongs, we encounter difficulties in its deductive process. Two of its premises, necessary for deriving its conclusion, are hidden premises. Premise (5), it is true, is implicit in the first three premises. The argument, however, would have been clearer if this premise had been stated more explicitly. But what about premise (6)? Not only is this a hidden premise, but it is arbitrary. We are simply told that essential direct reception means the direct reception of both the primary and secondary intelligibles. How do we derive this definition? There seems to be nothing in the proof to allow this derivation. The argument here seems ad hoc.
Perhaps the most serious difficulty we encounter in the proof is in the main deduction quoted in Part II. Its ambiguity leaves the relation of the angelic intellect to ordinary souls far from clear. Thus we are not told that the angelic exists in some men and not in all men. We gather that it exists only in some men from the recapitulation that follows this passage and from our acquaintance with Avicenna's theory of prophecy elsewhere. When we are told that the angelic intellect "by its very reception causes the other powers of the soul to receive," it is not clear whether "the other powers of the soul" refers to the 34 The reference to al-Ghaz•li is of particular significance here and for two reasons. In refuting the Islamic philosophers he is fully conscious of the formal basis of his attack: he strives to show that they had fulfilled neither of the conditions mentioned above for demonstrating their theories. Al-GhazdlI, Tahdfut al-Faldsifa, p. 16. Moreover, he rejects one aspect of Avicenna's theory of prophecy, the account of imaginative revelation, on the grounds that it is based on the emanative theory that holds that the spheres have souls, something which has not been demonstrated. Ibid., p. 261. would mean, in effect, that the existence of prophets is the precondition of all human knowing. It implies a causal relation between the prophetic faculty and the faculties of other men which becomes even more difficult to understand when we are told elsewhere in the al-Shif~i that prophets do not exist in every age.35 If, however, it is the first which is meant--and this seems the more plausible interpretation-where do ordinary men acquire the power to receive the primary intelligibles directly? For, if we have followed the reasoning correctly, accidental direct reception is necessarily induced by essential direct reception. In brief, the main difficulty with the proof is that it has not explained the transition it makes from the existence of accidental direct reception in all men, to the essential direct reception of the prophetic few.
